

H1N1 09 INFLUENZA Swine Flu

An Aeromedical
Perspective

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Acknowledgement

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H1N1 Influenza 09

- H1N1 first confirmed case April 2009 - North America
 - Swine flu - novel but not new
 - An animal influenza virus that has undergone transformation into a human influenza virus
- June 2009 -WHO declares Pandemic H1N1
 - Human to human transmission occurring at a community level across multiple countries and WHO regions
- April 2010
 - 213 countries affected
 - 16 455 deaths worldwide



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Effects in Australia



- 37693 confirmed cases
- High risk people
 - Pregnant
 - Younger children
 - Chronic lung diseases & other medical conditions
- 13% hospitalised
- 14% of those requiring ICU
- 191 H1N1 Influenza 09 related deaths
- Deaths affecting younger people

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Effects on RFDS (Qld) Surge capacity & demand for services

- Initially little effect on RFDS due to Queensland Health (QH) policy of non aeromedical transport for suspected H1N1 infected patients
- July 2009 - notification from QH of pandemic modeling indicating dramatic increased demand for aeromedical transport would be required
- RFDS (Qld) went into planning mode



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RFDS Aeromedical Bases in Qld

- Brisbane - 2 aircraft
- Bundaberg - 1 aircraft
- Rockhampton - 2 aircraft
- Townsville - 1 aircraft
- Cairns - 1 aircraft
- Mt Isa - 2 aircraft
- Charleville - 1 Aircraft shared as clinic aircraft



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Surge capacity plan

- Tier 1

- Brisbane capacity increase from 2 day and 1 night aircraft and crew to 2 day and 2 night planned and rostered for

- Tier 2

- 2nd Rockhampton aircraft to transfer to Cairns and crewed for day and night (to accommodate increased North Qld demand)

- Tier 3

- Reconfigure clinic aircraft into aeromedical configuration

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Identified issues with surge plan - staffing

• Tier 1

- Annual leave, study leave cancellation and recalling staff from administrative roles to achieve required staffing levels to man BNE aircraft for 2 day and 2 night shifts
- Rostered in stand by mode

• Tier 2 and 3

FN staffing very problematic – consideration of:

- Further leave cancellations
- Employment of locums (scarce as employed in overwhelmed ED's)
- Accessing FN's from other RFDS sections

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Challenges for aeromedicine - infectious diseases & control measures

- Paucity of literature of aeromedical environment and transmission of infectious diseases - what does exist relates to commercial jet aircraft
- Risk of disease transmission in RFDS type aircraft is unknown and indeterminate
- Ideally - don't transfer infectious patients aeromedically
- Reality - patient requires transfer to higher level of care, distances in QLD demand aeromedical transfer

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Prevention of transmission of infectious diseases in the aeromedical environment



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Challenge - The Aeromedical Environment



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Royal Flying Doctor Service
The furthest corner. The finest care.

How to minimise risk of transmission to crew and other patients??

- PPE
 - Respirator choice - N95 high particulate respirator
 - Fit testing staff - including pilots



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
How to minimise risk of transmission to crew and other patients??

- Use of alcoholic based hand rub
- Isolation measure - curtain between cabin and cockpit
- Decontamination measures



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Effect of Decontamination measures on turn around times



Staff health & post exposure prophylaxis

- Staff who fit the criteria of 'vulnerable' or 'at risk' could decline the tasking of an ILI patient
- Post ILI exposure prophylaxis of Tamiflu made available to staff
- Staff Fluvax® vaccination and Panvax® vaccination when available
- 1 operational employee confirmed to have H1N1 09



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H1N1 09 related workload activity


Difficult to determine accurate figures

- Most patients transferred from lower level facility with minimal diagnostic capabilities to a higher level facility i.e. transferred prior to definitive diagnosis
- Internal register - a number of ICD-10 codes fitted ILI
- Specific code for suspected H1N1 09 was not determined until half way through the outbreak
- RFDS unable to access pathology results to determine diagnosis


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Aeromedical activity

Comparison of Number of Aeromedical transfers 1 June - 31 August 2008 and 1 June - 31 August 2009



Comparison of Number of Aeromedical ILI transfers from 1 June - 31 August 2008 and 1 June - 31 August 2009




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Priority of ILI transfers


Patient Priority Category	Definition
1	response time less than 1 hour
2	response time between 1-3 hours
3	response time between 3-6 hours
4	response time between 6-24 hours
5	response time greater than 24 hours

ILI Patient Priority & Acuity




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ILI transfers by age



Base ILI activity



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Lessons learned

- Employee training in infection control (not just clinicians)
- Encouragement to staff protect themselves via vaccination
- Data collection inconsistencies
- Access to patient diagnosis post transfer



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Conclusion

- Surge plan developed but not tested
- Infection control requirements unique to aeromedical environment
- Cooperation and communication with key stakeholders
- **ARE WE (YOU) REALLY PREPARED FOR THE NEXT PANDEMIC??**



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